Straining Their Brains: Why the Case Against Enhancement is Not Persuasive. by Caplan, Arthur L. & McHugh, Paul R
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Neuroethics Publications Center for Neuroscience & Society 
September 2004 
Straining Their Brains: Why the Case Against Enhancement is Not 
Persuasive. 
Arthur L. Caplan 
University of Pennsylvania, caplan@mail.med.upenn.edu 
Paul R. McHugh 
Johns Hopkins University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs 
Recommended Citation 
Caplan, A. L., & McHugh, P. R. (2004). Straining Their Brains: Why the Case Against Enhancement is Not 
Persuasive.. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/29 
© 2004. Permission from Dana Press. Reprinted from Cerebrum, Volume 6, Issue 4, Fall 2004, pages 13-29. 
Publisher URL: http://www.dana.org/books/press/cerebrum/ 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/29 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Straining Their Brains: Why the Case Against Enhancement is Not Persuasive. 
Abstract 
Your kid’s schoolwork not up to par? Looking for Mr. or Ms. Right? Any other problems caused by a mind’s 
eye seemingly not quite on the ball? Answers might lie in a brain-enhancing pill. Some argue this is merely 
better living through chemistry and in line with humanity’s self-improving actions throughout history, but 
others suggest that quick-fix medications could well distort the very things that make us human. Here a 
leading bioethicist squares off with a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics on the controversy 
about pursuing better brains with a little help from biotechnology. 
Comments 
© 2004. Permission from Dana Press. Reprinted from Cerebrum, Volume 6, Issue 4, Fall 2004, pages 
13-29. 
Publisher URL: http://www.dana.org/books/press/cerebrum/ 
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/29 
Cerebrum
The Dana Forum on Brain Science
Volume 6 ■ Number 4 ■ Fall 2004
Cerebrum
©2004 Dana Press
The Dana Foundation
www.dana.org
About the Authors:
Arthur L. Caplan, Ph.D., is Emmanuel and Robert Hart Professor of Bioethics,
Chair of the Department of Medical Ethics, and the Director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author or editor of 25 books
and more than 500 professional papers. He writes a regular column on bioethics
for MSNBC.com and is a frequent guest and commentator in other media outlets.
Paul R. McHugh, M.D., a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, is
University Distinguished Service Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine and Professor in the Department of Mental Health in the
Bloomberg School of Public Health Johns Hopkins University. He was formerly the
Psychiatrist-in-Chief of the Johns Hopkins Hospital. Among his honors are the
Menninger Award of the American College of Physicians, the Zubin Award of the
American Psychopathological Association, and election to the Institute of Medicine,
National Academy of Sciences.
A R T I C L E
Shall We Enhance? A Debate
Arthur L. Caplan and Paul R. McHugh
Your kid’s schoolwork not up to par? Looking for Mr. or Ms. Right? Any other problems caused by 
a mind’s eye seemingly not quite on the ball? Answers might lie in a brain-enhancing pill. Some
argue this is merely better living through chemistry and in line with humanity’s self-improving
actions throughout history, but others suggest that quick-fix medications could well distort the
very things that make us human. Here a leading bioethicist squares off with a member of the
President’s Council on Bioethics on the controversy about pursuing better brains with a little help
from biotechnology.
Just a few decades ago, “mind-expanding”
drugs were the province of the avant garde,
the rebellious, or the just plain irresponsible.
Now, much as laser surgery enhances our 
eyesight, new drugs may enhance the power of
the mind not only for the risk-taking few but
for virtually any of us, on demand. While
some observers argue that such innovations
are only the latest in a long historical march
toward human betterment and should be 
welcomed, others are more cautious. Tinkering 
with an otherwise healthy brain can be counter-
productive, dissidents argue. Cerebrum invited
Prof. Arthur L. Caplan, Director of the 
Center for Bioethics at the University of
Pennsylvania, and Dr. Paul R. McHugh, a 
member of the President’s Council on Bioethics,
to debate the “enhancement” issue from the
sides that each of them favors. Prof. Caplan
and Dr. McHugh ﬁrst put forward their
positions in written statements, which they
then exchanged to write rejoinders. They used
as the fulcrum of their debate the report of
the President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond
Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of
Happiness (from which a chapter on another
topic, age retardation, is excerpted elsewhere
in this issue). 
by Arthur L. Caplan, Ph.D., 
and Paul R. McHugh, M.D.
Shall We Enhance? A Debate
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The purveyors of this procedure often
promise that those who have it will see 
better than they ever have before, even with
the aid of glasses or contact lenses. Laser
surgery sometimes can give eyes better 
than 20-20 vision. 
So have those who have undergone
this type of procedure and achieved
enhanced vision done something immoral?
If you were to read the recent report of the
President’s Council on Bioethics, entitled
Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the 
Pursuit of Happiness,1 or a recent article by 
a member of that council, Michael J. Sandel,2
you might believe they had. 
The arguments the Council and its
members make against enhancement merit
close scrutiny, not only because they have
commanded much attention from policy
makers and the media but because these
arguments are mistaken. And as new
knowledge about enhancing another part 
of the human nervous system—the brain—
becomes available, it is all the more impor-
tant that ﬂawed moral reasoning does not
hinder how this knowledge is used.
WISHING FOR BETTER BRAINS
Beyond Therapy is not mainly focused on
new knowledge of the human eye or brain
per se or how such knowledge might be
used to enhance humanity. It is mostly 
concerned with efforts to improve children
through genetic manipulation, gene therapy,
and pharmacological agents, as well as with
efforts to extend life and control aging
through genetic engineering and other
means. Nonetheless, it is easy to see that the
kinds of concerns fueling the angst that so
permeates this report are surely meant to
generally rebuke efforts to improve mental
performance as well.
For the most part, those who study
the brain have very little interest in enhanc-
ing or optimizing anything. They seek to
know how the brain works. Many scientists
and physicians are also keenly interested in
determining how, if possible, to repair the
devastating impact of injury, disability, and
disease that strike the brain.
But potential interest in brain
enhancement is enormous. Already, a 
number of pharmaceutical and nutritional-
supplement companies are interested in 
selling drugs that, like modaﬁnil, allow 
individuals to go without sleep for longer
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By some estimates, nearly 1.5 millionAmericans have undergone lasersurgery to improve their vision.
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periods of time than they otherwise could
or herbal substances that allegedly improve
memory or sexual enjoyment. These are,
arguably, enhancement drugs. And two
things have not escaped some scientists’
notice: that a drug capable of helping an
Alzheimer’s patient retain memory function
might also provide some enhancement 
to those who simply have poor memory
skills; and that the market possibilities for
selling a drug such as a memory enhancer
are huge.
Many students, for example, are keenly
interested in any drug that might improve
their ability on tests or in musical, dramatic,
or athletic performances by allowing for
increased short-term memory, greater
attention span, or reduced anxiety. The 
military has an interest in seeing mental
performance improved so as to increase 
the combat effectiveness of individuals and
units. And not a few of us drink coffee, tea, 
colas, and other stimulants to try to enhance 
our cognitive performance. Many people
take various drugs, foods, and herbs, or 
utilize technology such as virtual reality, 
to try to enhance their mood, emotional
state, sexual enjoyment, or range of sensory
experience.
While these activities can be, and 
sometimes are, abused, it would hardly seem 
morally objectionable to try to improve
one’s mental abilities. Surely it is the critics
of efforts to improve the brain that bear the
burden of showing why this is wrong. 
GOING BAD BY DOING BETTER
So what are the Council’s and Professor
Sandel’s moral concerns about efforts to
improve, enhance, or optimize our brains,
vision, or any other human organ or trait?
Their objections seem to be that:
1. The happiness or satisfaction achieved 
through engineering is seductive and 
will lead to a deformation of our 
character and spirit; 
2. Engineered improvements in perfor-
mance are not authentic, not earned, 
and therefore not morally commend-
able;
3. To accept enhancement for our 
children will undermine and deform 
the role of the parent.
None of these arguments provides 
a sufﬁcient reason to oppose enhancement
or optimization, be it of our vision or our
brains, our own or our children’s. Each
argument carries some emotive force but 
is not a sound basis for rejecting choices
that individuals might make to improve or
optimize themselves or their children. This
is not to say that every choice for enhance-
ment or optimization is beyond moral 
criticism or even morally valid. But it is 
to say that those who would have us turn 
away in principle from all forms of enhance-
ment or optimization have not made a
convincing case.
Each argument carries some 
emotive force but is not a sound
basis for rejecting choices that 
individuals might make to improve
or optimize themselves or their 
children.
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Consider this question from the 
President’s Council, which suggests that 
all efforts at enhancement will distort or
deform our character:
Indeed, why would one need to discipline 
one’s passions, reﬁne one’s sentiments, 
and cultivate one’s virtues—in short, to 
organize one’s soul for action in the 
world—when one’s aspiration to happiness 
could be satisﬁed by drugs in a quick, 
consistent, and cost-effective manner?
The concern expressed here is that if 
we enhanced ourselves and our achievements
and enjoyments came easy, why would we
continue striving to be good and virtuous
people?
THE WRONG CULPRIT 
The problem with this argument is that
many people who do not now strive to be
good and virtuous are neither enhanced
nor optimized in any way. Laying the blame
for vice at the foot of enhancement ignores
the inconvenient fact that the desires for
quick returns, easy money, and instant 
gratiﬁcation have nothing at all to do with
enhancement. They are traits of many, if
not most, human beings. The notion of
character development implicit in this
account has deeper roots in ﬁctionalized
accounts of young men at boarding schools
than in anything that accurately describes
how human beings actually evolve the 
character traits that they manifest. 
Still, the council broods in Beyond
Therapy, easy pleasures and cheap thrills will 
make us weak and spineless. There is nothing
like misery to make us stronger. Sorrow,
courageously confronted, can make us wiser
and more compassionate. By the same kind
of logic, the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants, when used
to reduce our sorrows, would endanger this
aspect of affective life. Because they dull 
our capacity to feel psychic pain, they would 
render us less capable of experiencing and
learning from misfortune or tragedy or
empathizing with the miseries of others. If
some virtues can be taught only through
very trying circumstances, those virtues
might be lost or at least less developed. 
Putting aside the fact that sorrow can also
drive some to suicide and bring others to
dysfunction and despair, is it really true that
improvement and virtue cannot co-exist?
The Council’s argument is a bit like those
who worried what the military airplane
would do to the virtues of the ground 
combat soldier—that the improved technol-
ogy would make obsolete the kind of
courage needed for a frontal assault. Oh
really? Tell that to the ﬁghter pilot who
needs to evade ground-to-air missiles or to
the helicopter pilot evacuating a wounded
soldier under a barrage of ground ﬁre. 
Improving performance is not necessar-
ily toxic to virtue. It simply shifts how virtue 
is manifest. It is highly unlikely that those 
with enhanced vision or muscles or brains 
would lack for challenges in the real world.
Putting aside the fact that sorrow 
can also drive some to suicide and 
bring others to dysfunction and 
despair, is it really true that improve-
ment and virtue cannot co-exist? 
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SATISFACTION NOT GUARANTEED
So the case is not made that improving our
brains will destroy our character. What then?
The Council wrings its collective hands at
the prospect that enhancement of the brain
or optimization of brain performance will
cheapen the value of our experiences:
But seldom do those who win by cheating 
or who love by deceiving cease to long for 
the joy and fulﬁllment that come from 
winning fair and square or being loved for 
who one truly is. Many stoop to fraud to 
obtain happiness, but none want their 
feeling of ﬂourishing itself to be fraudulent. 
Yet a fraudulent happiness is just what the 
pharmacological management of our mental
lives threatens to confer upon us.
Translation: If you don’t really earn
your performance, if you do not sweat and
toil at it, then it will not be authentic, and 
it will ultimately prove unsatisfying. One is
tempted to ask who is writing this stuff—is 
the Council somehow psychically channeling
our Puritan Protestant ancestors?
Certainly it is exciting to achieve 
satisfaction by testing our limits, by seeing
what we can achieve by striving, struggling,
and working to overcome innate bound-
aries. But it is also very satisfying to have
beneﬁts that simply come from out of the
blue or through good fortune. No people
with enhanced vision that I have ever
encountered feel the least bit of guilt,
shame, or doubt that the improved vision
they enjoy is fraudulent because they did
nothing to deserve or earn it except pay
their money and let a laser do its thing. 
Life is full of many pleasures that are not
earned by testing our limits but that are 
fully and thoroughly enjoyed. Think of 
the pleasure in winning the lottery; or in
being reassured that your friends like you
even though you cheat at cards, cannot 
stop smoking, eat too much, or are some-
times boring; or in solving problems using
computers and any other form of techno-
logical assistance you can muster to aid 
your fallible brain.
We do not always have to “earn” 
our happiness to be really and truly happy.
Nor do we reject as fraudulent those things
that make us happy that we have done 
little or nothing to earn. An enhanced 
brain or improved cognitive functioning
would not in principle undermine the 
ethos of authenticity that undergirds human
satisfaction because that infrastructure is 
not as the Council depicts it. Authentic 
happiness sometimes results from success 
in the battle against limits, but authentic
happiness can also result from luck, happen-
stance, serendipity, gifts, indulgence, 
whimsy, and, although the Council seems
unable to fathom the possibility, even vice.
IMPROVING CHILDREN
Lastly, consider the concerns of the Council’s
Sandel writing in The Atlantic. He is 
worried that if we seek to perfect our 
children—to enhance and optimize them—
we will no longer see them as “gifts”:
Life is full of many pleasures that 
are not earned by testing our limits 
but that are fully and thoroughly 
enjoyed.
In a social world that prizes mastery and 
control, parenthood is a school for humility.
That we care deeply about our children 
and yet cannot choose the kind we want 
teaches parents to be open to the unbidden.
Such openness is a disposition worth 
afﬁrming … it invites us to abide the 
unexpected, to live with dissonance, to 
rein in the impulse to control.
Put aside the irony of the author, a professor 
at a school (Harvard University) that
inspires parents to devote enormous 
resources to enhance their children’s abilities 
so that they may enter there, extolling the
idea of accepting your kids as they “are.”
Ignore the fact that the vision of parenting
put forward seems unduly bound by an
upper-class American vision of what makes
for desirable parenthood—no collective 
parenting or parent-child estrangement
cloud Sandel’s vision. Is there value to be
found in accepting the random draw of 
the genetic lottery with respect to one’s
children? Should a random point mutation
that produces a slight change in a trait, or 
a spontaneous recombination of genetic
material, really be seen as the source of 
value in creating the unexpected in our 
offspring? 
It seems to me that much of what
parents traditionally do is try to shape and
control their children. Would changing
what the accidents of nature produce really
result in a child that is any less the object 
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of parental design? And would such change
lessen parental affection for the child? It is
not self-evident that this must be so. One
can accept a gift, embellish, tweak, noodle,
and modify it in order to improve it, and
still cherish what was given as a gift.
The case against all enhancements is
not made. Which, again, is not to say that
all enhancements are, of necessity, good or
desirable. But it is to say that “in-principle”
objections to enhancement should not
deter those who seek to improve their 
own minds or those of their children. 
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Is there value to be found in accept-
ing the random draw of the genetic 
lottery with respect to one’s children? 
The Dana Forum on Brain Science
of the book Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Happiness, many ask,
“Why are you guys worrying about the 
off-label use of medications” such as
growth hormones, steroids, stimulants, 
and antidepressants? By “off-label” they
mean the use of these drugs and hormones
not, as originally intended, to cure people
of conditions such as depression, infection,
or hormone deﬁciency but to enable the
healthy to become stronger, quicker, or
taller than they would naturally. “After all,”
they note, “who’s to say where sickness
ends and health begins—and anyway, why
can’t folks try stuff as long as it doesn’t
hurt them?” 
These natural questions are relatively
easy to answer, as they all in some way turn 
on concerns over the risks involved in taking 
medications. But I remind my interlocutors 
that people do certainly sense other problems
in “off-label” medications and express their
concerns. Witness the recent outcry in the
newspapers, picked up and ampliﬁed by the
president’s State of the Union address, over
major league baseball players who increased 
their strength—and disrupted the credibility 
of their records—by using muscle-enhancing 
steroids and growth hormones on the advice 
of their trainers and physicians. 
Some critics of this practice were con-
cerned over the risks to health these profes-
sional athletes were prepared (or pressured)
to accept. Indeed, these risks are not trivial.
But many more were troubled by what 
biologic enhancements implied about the
meaning of achievement in sport and the
values expressed in athletic competition.
A QUESTION OF PURPOSE
Several of my questioners did identify this
challenging question from the controversy
over sports by asking: “Just what are you
trying to preserve or defend when you
debate the use of medications to enhance
some trait, rather than treat an illness?” 
I hold that answering this question of 
purpose is central not only to the sports
issue but also to the mission of the Council
itself. Therefore, I begin by noting how 
this Council was charged by the president 
to spur public discussion on bioethics in a
fashion that would get beyond some simple
calculus of risks and beneﬁts to consider
what challenges to human values and moral
purpose the new discoveries in biomedicine
could bring to us as people. Sport is one
arena where such challenges would emerge,
but hardly the only one. 
No Veterinarian to
“The Naked Ape” I 
McHugh Statement 
As I recount to colleagues our debatewithin the President’s Council on iBioethics leading to the publication 
Speciﬁcally, in working with our 
chairman, Leon Kass, to produce Beyond
Therapy, we Council members explored 
how medications with effects on mood 
and cognition, so useful in treating certain
mental disorders, might alter a doctor’s
practice with people seeking to enhance
desirable traits. 
Doctors, after all, do not see them-
selves as veterinarians to Desmond Morris’s
Naked Ape—workers who tinker with the
bodily structure and function of a human 
as if they were simply beeﬁng up a biologic
machine. They hold that, as advisors and
teachers, they treat people who need more
than technological know-how in order to
thrive, who need help to understand what
goes into a good human life and how it can
go awry. However, as information spreads
about medications, some patients—perhaps 
better called “clients”—are turning up asking 
for and expecting novel pharmacologic 
services from their doctors, services that
may not extend the patients’ best interests.
Beyond Therapy intends to spur the public 
to think about these matters. 
Case examples help make these ideas
about apt and inapt use of medications—
especially the newly discovered medications
—clear. Here are three, chosen because each
depicts a particular aspect of contemporary
life in a psychiatric practice and represents 
a situation where human hopes and fears 
are in play. In each, medications are an issue
even though a “quick ﬁx” with some med-
ication not only would have fallen short of 
a solution but might well have distracted
everyone from the central and deeply
human issues at the heart of the problem.
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A FRUSTRATED YOUNG MAN 
To begin: at least once a year, I am asked 
to see some young man (seldom a young
woman) whose parents worry about his
school performance and are wondering
whether some medications—either sedatives
for his mild test anxiety or stimulants for
his mild distractibility—might enhance it.
The parents are gifted professionals with
long records of academic success and 
honors (valedictorians, Phi Beta Kappa 
election, etc.). They worry that their 
son’s present school record and lack of
scholastic achievements matching theirs
indicate either that something is wrong
with him that I might ﬁx with one of 
these new medications they have read
about, or that he has some unapparent 
psychological conﬂict that I might resolve
for him. 
The truth is that the son does not
have the superior IQ of his parents. The
statistical “reversion to the mean” inherent
in the genetic roulette of a polygenic 
feature such as IQ has brought him a 
somewhat lower capacity than his gifted
parents. But often he, and subjects like him, 
more than balance this aspect of their make-
up by displaying—and in fact surpassing
My task in this situation is to get the
parents to forget about adjusting
him to their aims with medications
or anything else. I want them to 
appreciate what he brings to them 
and to all of us in life-afﬁrming ways. 
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their parents in—several other ﬁne human
characteristics. He may be handsome,
charming, athletic, graceful. These traits
are visible and acknowledged by all, even
though, on the day I see him, his most
prominent feature is his frustration over
disappointing his parents. 
My task in this situation is to get 
the parents to forget about adjusting him
to their aims with medications or anything
else. I want them to appreciate what he
brings to them and to all of us in life-
afﬁrming ways. I point out that no one 
can “major in IQ” in life, but anyone can
use a whole variety of assets to make life
work for him or her. These parents need 
to understand the young man for what 
he is and use their talents—and social 
connections if need be—to guide him
toward enterprises that will employ his 
particular talents and skills to build a life
and a career. They should emphasize his
strengths, stop trying to make him more
like themselves, and give up their notion
(common, I’ve discovered, among the 
gifted) that the only path to success in life
is the one they followed. 
I do not immediately succeed in 
this process with some of these parents,
primarily because at the start they assume
that my job is to do their bidding and 
“ﬁx” the young man rather than reinter-
pret their situation for them. But with 
time I can usually win them over, thanks
mainly to the natural affection all parents
have for their offspring, but also because 
I, an outsider, embarrassed them into
thinking about the gifts of life by empha-
sizing what is attractive about their son.
RIGHT FEELINGS, WRONG OBJECTS
Here is a second prototypic example of
how assumptions about life can, in the 
present era, prompt a search for enhance-
ment medications that misses the point. 
A young woman arrives in my ofﬁce
depressed and concerned about what she
imagines to be some ﬂaw in her psycholog-
ical makeup that renders her unattractive 
to others. Her concerns, it turns out, have
emerged from several failed romances.
Each seems to have followed the same
course: she meets an attractive young man
and develops a relationship that rather
promptly—as is customary with young
people now—becomes an intimate one.
After some months, and just as she has
begun to hope they will marry and start 
a family together, he tells her he is “not
ready” for such a serious commitment and
its attendant responsibilities. She concludes
he is not sufﬁciently interested in her, 
and soon they part. 
The repetitiveness of this experience—
right down to the stock expression “I’m not
ready”—leads her to believe that something 
about her is to blame. She wonders, as she
reﬂects on her feelings and her behavior, 
if she’s “too intense,” “too possessive,” or
“too needy.” She’s certainly disheartened
and demoralized, and she asks me for 
medication for her mood and perhaps
some other medications that would reduce
her anxiety around men—making her per-
haps more “relaxed” about these matters.
I notice how she is distressed and
concerned about male withdrawal but seeks 
to explain it as a result of her shortcomings. 
With these ideas in my mind, I try to show
her that, in expecting intimacy to lead to
commitment, she is the one who is acting
in a natural way, and her boyfriends are not.
I tell her that she needs neither a sedative
for her thoughts nor an antidepressant 
to rid her of her low mood but a better
assessment of the situation she faces. 
When I eventually point out how
contemporary sexual mores, supported by
easy contraception, tend to emphasize what
one receives from an intimate relationship 
rather than what one brings to it—i.e. taking 
something from one another rather than
making something together—she may 
wonder, primarily because she has never
heard such ideas from a doctor, whether
she has come to the right ofﬁce. Only after
ﬁguratively catching her breath does she ask
exactly what I think she should do in these
situations. I respond to this question by
saying she will need some coaching or
“cognitive-behavioral” psychotherapy as she
approaches affectionate relationships in the
future. I suggest several therapists—usually
female—who have helped other young
women I referred.
She came with the belief that her
moods and distress represented some set 
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of pathologic features in herself. I try to
help her appreciate that she has been coop-
erating with a cultural system that permits
males to remain perpetual adolescents (and
even offers them a standard excuse line,
“I’m not ready”), postponing indeﬁnitely
their transition into responsible—read
“stand-up”—men. Her goal should be to
ﬁgure out how to stop cooperating with
this system and its misuse of her.
TEMPTING THOUGHTS
As a ﬁnal example of the temptation to 
use pharmacologic tools for enhancement, 
I offer an experience and thought experiment 
from my personal, rather than professional,
life. I enjoy periodic, several-day visits from
my 8-year-old grandson. We do many things
together, but one that we enjoy is playing
chess and analyzing situations on the board.
He’s pretty good for a youngster, and for 
a period of about half to three-quarters of 
an hour, we can concentrate together on
these problems. 
But as the time passes I sense his atten-
tion waning and eventually—sooner than I do 
—he wearies of these “if the opponent makes 
that move then we should follow with this 
response” analyses. I’ve learned to offer him
something else to do with me then—best
something more physical such as running or
throwing a ball—all with the tacit agreement
that “maybe later” we could return to chess. 
The thought experiment, though,
comes as I realize how, with a medication
such as Ritalin, I could hold him longer at
the chessboard, enjoy the interplay with him 
for a greater stretch of time, and even, so I
might rationalize, make him a better player.
She came with the belief that her
moods and distress represented some 
set of pathologic features in herself. 
I try to help her appreciate that she
has been cooperating with a cultural
system that permits males to remain
perpetual adolescents.
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The thought is enough to identify the 
injustice. To use my medical skills to draw
something I want from him rather than to
accept and support the break from effort 
his nature seeks is to deny, indeed belittle,
his boyhood. “More recess, less Ritalin” 
I regularly prescribe to people worried about
how boys tend to be restless in class. I’m
even more conﬁdent of the wisdom in that
prescription after spending time so happily
with a ﬁrst-rate example of the group.
CHEATING VICTORY OF ITS MEANING
With these case examples in mind, let us
now return to the sports problem that may
be the greatest source of public interest and
disquiet over pharmacologic enhancements
today. I hold that the expressions of 
concern brought out in those discussions
resemble in many ways the concerns raised
in my clinical examples. I also believe that
some aspects of the solutions likely to be
effective for these athletes will apply to 
practice with patients such as I’ve described. 
Much will depend on attitudes in the com-
munity about what is to be admired and
what is to be scorned, about what advances
and what retards our human pursuits. 
William James referred to organized
sports as “the moral equivalent of war.”
And for most of us that’s just why we are
drawn to the games, as both players and
spectators. Nowhere else can we see human 
beings struggling to be their best, displaying 
the strenuous, dare one say manly, virtues
of courage, tenacity, and self-sacriﬁce for
some collective victory in an arena where
blood is not shed and lives are not lost. At
its best, organized sport works as a tangible
and direct moral educator to us all, by 
identifying people who have honed wonder-
ful physical gifts and, often, demonstrating
how adversity and stress can be overcome
through persistence and bravery put into
play with a sense of purpose.
Major League Baseball should free
itself from the misuse of steroids and other
drugs not just by appropriate supervision,
rules, and stiff ﬁnes but as well by ridicule,
contempt, and moral reprobation of the
offending athletes by their peers and by 
the supporters of the game. This reproving
stance derives from rejecting the “anything
goes” view of athletic competitions and is
inspired by respect for the opportunity in
sport to witness remarkable combinations
of human gifts and virtues, played out in a
framework of conventions that give those
gifts and virtues a stage. Artiﬁcially altering 
the players—distorting their bodies and mak-
ing them somehow chemically different from
the rest of us—debases this opportunity. 
Most of us can see these points 
immediately and appreciate that unnatural
procedures, by severing performance from
effort, cheat victory of its meaning. In the
same way, I try to encourage my patients to
see the real goals embedded in their pursuit
of happiness. Thus I do not aim to cover
over a painful but natural response to life
circumstances or tone up some cosmetic
ﬂaw. Rather I seek to help a person ﬁnd
coherence and direction in his or her life 
so as to resolve some of the difﬁculties
prompting the trip to a psychiatrist. “Man
does not live on pharmaceuticals alone,” 
we might say today in updating the Gospels. 
I apply that lesson repeatedly in my ofﬁce. 
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Each person in my case examples
needed help to recognize just how, like 
the use of steroids by baseball players, the
pharmacologic interventions they wanted
would be wrong. Here medicating might
not be against some formal rule, but it
would in important ways distort the goal 
of treatment and often turn attention away
from the real nature of the situation. In all
three cases this goal was to recognize the
challenging realities built into human life
and how best to meet them. The ﬁrst case
illustrated how one should recognize and
honor the diversity of excellence to be
found among people, the second how to
recognize and honor the natural assump-
tions of human affection, and the last 
how to recognize and honor psychological
characteristics built into and appropriate for
the different stages of human development.
To intervene with medications in any of
these examples might have helped achieve
some narrow aim but would have done so 
at the price of loss of reverence for the good 
things that life, outside our command,
brings to us and prompts us to fulﬁll. 
THE MORAL BOTTOM LINE
As anyone who reads Beyond Therapy will
quickly appreciate, the Council was not
calling for laws to deal with these issues of
“off-label” treatments. We thought and
wrote differently here than we would 
about matters where life and death—or
even physical well-being—are involved. 
Different members brought different expe-
riences with biologic enhancements to this
discussion. All, though, wanted to help the
public to appreciate both what great goods
these new medicines bring to our treatment
of the mentally ill and the many aspects of
human life at stake as our knowledge in
psychopharmacology expands.
In particular, I wanted to emphasize
what psychiatric practice taught me about
what to behold, identify, and admire in
individual lives. I’ve learned that, when no
psychiatric illness disrupts the picture and
calls for medical relief with these new 
medications, these assets usually offset the
challenging blemishes that remain for each
of us to overcome. People triumph over 
these milder handicaps when they are helped 
to make sense of their circumstances, live up 
to their gifts, and cultivate those strenuous 
virtues of self-sufﬁciency, energy, loyalty,
and independence of mind that grow with
practice over time. 
As a doctor, the moral “bottom line”
for me in the use of all medications (not
just the new ones) is: Turn to a medication
only after you have thought carefully about
the patient’s symptoms and complaints and
decided these issues represent or express
some disruption of brain function or 
structure in need of medical management.
Otherwise, help those who consult you to
see what they can do to make better sense
of their situations and deal more effectively
with them. If this method of assessment 
is followed, then the new discoveries in
pharmacology will work as they were
designed and a coherent, effective practice
of psychiatry will proceed for the beneﬁt 
of all. 
The Dana Forum on Brain Science
Every so often a physician will complain to
me that it is impossible to get families to
consent to the cessation of life-extending
medical treatments for their terminally ill
loved ones. These doctors are not talking
about borderline cases; they are talking
about situations in which a patient is in 
the ﬁnal throes of cancer, the last stages 
of AIDS, or at the brink of expiring from
congestive heart failure. But, still, the 
family insists that everything be done.
My response is to ask why the doctors
are listing options and alternatives. When
they look at me with an expression of 
confusion, I elaborate: Why are they not
presenting their recommendation about
what they believe is the appropriate thing to
do—in these particular situations, to shift
from therapeutic interventions to palliation.
The physicians sometimes angrily retort
that as someone in the ﬁeld of bioethics 
I should realize that their role is not to tell
people what to do (as these professionals’
role models and mentors once did) but to
give patients and families choices consistent
with the doctrine of informed consent that
bioethicists have supposedly drummed into
their heads as key to the moral practice of
medicine. This line of argument does not
move me, I respond, as informed consent 
is not simply giving people options and
alternatives. It is also sharing with them the
wisdom of experience and judgment about
what option is the best one to pursue.
Dr. McHugh’s comments on his
experiences with patients and families who
turn to the ﬁeld of medicine for pills and
nostrums to ﬁx the everyday woes of life
put me in mind of these conversations. 
He correctly points out that the right 
thing to do when confronted with parents
who want a pill to make their child smarter
or patients requesting a drug to calm 
their anxieties about an unsatisfactory love
life is to offer counsel about the acceptance 
of limits or the need to learn to cope 
with the challenges of disrespectful, 
outlandish, or crude behavior. Not every
insult, slight, failure, disappointment, 
and challenge in life merits the prescription 
of a pill.
Doctors are not waiters; they do not
simply respond to the orders and prefer-
ences of their patients. If bioethicists have
given medicine the idea that this is what
informed consent means, whether in the
ICU or in the practice of psychiatry, then
bioethics is wrong.
Important Treatment, Wrong 
Diagnosis: Enhancement is not to
blame for the abuse of autonomy
Caplan Rebuttal 
That said, the fact that medicine has
become beguiled by respect for patient
autonomy does not mean Dr. McHugh 
is right to commingle concerns about
enhancement with concerns about an
undue obeisance to patient preferences and
demands. While he is on the right path in
terms of providing sounder alternatives to
patients’ requests for “quick ﬁxes” and in
not yielding to their anger when he offers
direction rather than drugs, the source of
the more general problem is the medical
community’s overindulgence of patients’
demands—not the fact that they sometimes
demand enhancement.
Nor does the example of steroid use
in baseball take Dr. McHugh exactly where
he wants to go in cautioning about the
destructive inﬂuence of enhancement. 
True, some forms of enhancement seem to
undermine fair play in sports. But not all. 
I am reminded of a conversation I had 
with an Olympic ofﬁcial who pointed out
that the pleasure Americans and Europeans
take in beating basketball teams from Africa
is in no way diminished by the fact that the
African teams are undernourished, poorly
coached, and have almost no access to
training facilities. We are so used to these
forms of enhancement in our sports that
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not only do we not protest them, we are
downright angry if our favorite athletes 
do not have access to the best dietitians,
masseuses, sports psychologists, sports
physiologists, and strength coaches.
The dislike of steroids is the dislike 
of a dangerous drug. But it may or may not
extend to the professional baseball player
who has had laser surgery to improve his
vision or who pitches even better after
reconstructive surgery then he did before.
It is hard to draw the line when it
comes to enhancement. Surely medicine
should not simply prostitute itself to the
whims of its patients. The need to rein in
autonomy-run-amok in doctor-patient 
encounters is real. However, the patient
who seeks improvement may, even post-
counseling, continue to seek it. The point 
is not that all enhancement is bad, but 
that it is bad medicine to assume that if 
a patient wants the enhancement then it
must be bad. 
The dislike of steroids is the dislike 
of a dangerous drug. But it may or
may not extend to the professional
baseball player who has had laser
surgery to improve his vision.
The Dana Forum on Brain Science
The book Beyond Therapy here under 
discussion is a product of the President’s
Council on Bioethics. That preposition,
“on,” gets little attention but this debate
demands that we note what it implies. 
The Council is not a crew of bioethics
experts presenting its judgments to the
world. It is an assembly of scientists, physi-
cians, and humanists deliberating on the
mandate and portfolio of bioethics itself. 
By discussing vexatious biomedical matters
and publishing treatises drawing from 
these open discussions, we are ultimately
trying to discern whether the relatively 
new discipline of bioethics is entitled to
special standing or authority as a body of
organized thought enriching the alliance
between physicians and the public. Speciﬁ-
cally, does it improve upon the physician’s
traditional ethics of recognizing good prac-
tice in enterprises that function (to quote
the Hippocratic Oath) for “the beneﬁt of
the sick”?
Professor Caplan, an academic and
highly regarded bioethicist, is a spokesman
of this new discipline, and thus I’m deeply
disappointed that his views on the matters 
dealt with in Beyond Therapy are so dismissive.
We have heard rumblings of dissatisfaction 
with our Council’s thought and leadership 
from him, so I was eager to see a thoughtful 
recasting of the speciﬁc issues we raised that 
might amplify our efforts or display alternative
ways to come at them. Rather, Professor 
Caplan disparages the whole enterprise to 
consider and debate potentially deleterious 
sides to the promiscuous use—“beyond 
therapy”—of pharmacological treatments.
The Council members certainly knew
the value of these medications for the sick
but thought it wise to consider how they
might be used—or requested—when no
sickness was involved. Call our endeavor a
needed break in the headlong rush toward
nonmedical exploitation of biotechnology, 
a pause to consider any Huxleyan brave
new world implications that might rest
within the marvelous medical advances 
provided by modern drugs that affect the
mind and brain. 
Beyond Therapy boils down to the 
following questions: Are there any serious
problems to discuss here? Do, as Professor
Caplan claims, only Rugby-School-cold-
shower folk worry about biotechnology 
just as they abjure all creature comforts?
Are there things about human nature that
McHugh Rebuttal 
Professor Caplan treats all these
questions off-handedly—likening, 
I have to suppose, any concern for 
the huge increase in Ritalin 
prescriptions for children to worries 
over the American appetite for 
Starbucks coffee. 
Where’s the Wisdom?
we want to preserve when thinking about
prescribing these new medicines? 
Professor Caplan treats all these 
questions off-handedly—likening, I have to
suppose, any concern for the huge increase
in Ritalin prescriptions for children to 
worries over the American appetite for 
Starbucks coffee. Not only is his response
to the book a rebuke to the Council’s
effort, his answer to any concern expressed
by the Council is to tell us to get with the
program of modernity and stop bothering
everybody with trivia.
But he often seems to miss the point.
For example, he sees us as worrying that
“seductive” promises of bioengineering
“deform the role of parent.” We do have
concerns over “seduction” but not because
these promises “undermine…the parent.”
Rather, they distort everyone’s—parent 
and child’s—attitude towards childhood 
in exactly the way pushing kids to attend
Harvard, a practice apparently deplored by
Professor Caplan, does. 
I spoke as a practicing psychiatrist
about my worries with some of the empty
promises carried by the new pharmacology
in case examples I won’t repeat here. But
I’d like to mention something other than
the ﬂippancy of Professor Caplan’s exercise. 
I detect no sense of direction in his
commentary. As we doctors strive to help
patients separate the real from the false, we
can hope that bioethics, for which Professor 
Caplan speaks, might one day come up with 
better insights than suggesting we meet all 
demands for therapy, especially novel ones, 
by going with the tide. My cautions about
enhancement are no resistance to change
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but recognition of how, for doctors, 
going with the tide may mean forsaking the
responsibility—and opportunity—to consid-
er new technologies in the light of wisdom
derived from living and sympathetic contact
with real people. Proposing the treatment 
that best allows a patient to ﬂourish is seldom
simple, especially when many treatment
programs are available and each carries its
own complications. Surely physicians can
reasonably expect their professional ethics
to offer some principled inclination or
direction for their practices, given the
weight of responsibilities they carry.
Without thoughts that provide a 
sense of direction—such as emerges from
the reﬂections in the Hippocratic tradition
about the nature of “beneﬁt” and “harm”
in their dealings with patients—physicians 
are at the mercy of technologic illusions and 
detachments. These tend to promote actions 
at costs they don’t anticipate and exact a
penalty, in loss of trust, that they are called
to pay when damage cannot be repaired. 
Our Council published Beyond Therapy
not to worry the public or to legislate 
practices but to spur discussion about often
unseen features of the new biotherapies.
Bioethics was spawned from the philoso-
phical faculties but is now being tied 
more and more into medical discourse. 
If Professor Caplan’s unconcerned response
is representative of expert opinion from 
the new world of “ofﬁcial” bioethics, the
public will be disappointed by the contribu-
tions from that quarter and may wonder
about the value of that new enterprise in
thought. 
